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The CNCC Essay Award for Junior Scholars 
 
Fabio Paglieri, Manos Tsakiris, Till Vierkant 
 
 
As any other thriving field of scientific inquiry, consciousness studies face the need to 
captivate the interest of the most promising minds of the next generation of scholars. This is 
the reason why PhD programs, research networks, and dedicated labs are so essential to the 
development of the scientific study of consciousness.  In addition, this is why this issue of 
PSYCHE is devoted to showcase the best results of an unusual but most welcome initiative in 
this area: an essay prize for scientific papers on consciousness by junior scholars. Thus the 
reader will find gathered here the six best papers out of forty-eight that were submitted to the 
Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context (CNCC) Essay Award for Junior Scholars. 
This was an international open contest for scientific papers on consciousness studies authored 
by young researchers who were PhD students while the call was open (October 2007-
February 2008) or that had recently completed their PhD (no earlier than June 30, 2005). The 
papers are published here for the first time, along with critical commentaries by some of the 
most distinguished researchers in the field. The essay competition was sponsored by the 
European Science Foundation and managed within the EuroCORES programme 
Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context (CNCC), with the authors of this 
introduction  in charge of the organization. 
 
In presenting you this selection of remarkable essays, our purpose as editors is 
twofold: on the one hand, we intend to briefly outline the nature, scope, procedures, and 
outcomes of the CNCC Essay Award for Junior Scholars, hoping that it will help to foster a 
spawn of similar initiatives; on the other hand, we will provide the highlights of each 
individual paper, to help the reader navigate such a diverse collection of interdisciplinary 
contributions on different facets of consciousness. 
 
Starting in October 2007, junior scholars were invited to submit a scholarly essay on 
a relevant topic in the field of consciousness studies, covering one or more of the following 
themes: 
• Conceptual and methodological challenges 
• Metaphysics and phenomenology of consciousness 
• The sense of self 
• Consciousness and emotion 
• Norms and abnormalities in the study of consciousness 
• The phylogenetic, ontogenetic and historical development of consciousness 
• Consciousness and language 








Submitted essays had to be in English and describe original work, that is not yet 
published or submitted for publication elsewhere, although they may had been presented at 
conferences, workshops, symposia, and the like. Essays had to be demonstrably the product 
of the applicant’s own research efforts: joint contributions were also in principle accepted 
(although none was received), but only provided that (1) the applicant was the main and first 
author of the paper, and (2) it was clear that the applicant’s contribution was substantial with 
respect to previous works of his/her colleagues, and was not limited to glossing on such 
works.  
 
The contest was designed to have six finalists and two winners ex aequo, and the six 
finalists were notified at the beginning of May 2008. Each winner received a monetary prize, 
and all finalist papers, along with the commentaries provided by distinguished scholars in the 
field, are published in this issue of PSYCHE. The finalist papers were publicly presented by 
the authors in Edinburgh on June 27, 2008, at a special CNCC-sponsored event dedicated to 
the contest.  After the presentation,   the two winners were announced. Each paper was 
critically discussed by an outstanding scholar in the field, and the author had the opportunity 
to reply to his/her comments.  
As mentioned, the contest was sponsored by the European Science Foundation within 
the EuroCORES Program Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context (CNCC). CNCC 
members were invited to participate, but the contest was by no means limited to them or to 
European scholars: on the contrary, all young researchers from any country working in the 
field of consciousness studies were urged to submit their original work. The Scientific 
Committee responsible for the final decision was formed by both CNCC and non-CNCC 
scholars. A blind reviewing method was used, and authors were explicitly instructed to avoid 
including any information in the body of the paper or references that would identify their 
identity or their institutions. The peer-reviewing stage involved 64 anonymous reviewers, all 
senior scholars with research experience in several areas of consciousness studies, who 
produced 87 detailed reviews, assessing each paper in terms of originality, conceptual and 
empirical soundness, scholarly quality, and interdisciplinary content. Later on, the six finalist 
papers were independently re-assessed by the six jury members, who produced eighteen 
detailed reports on the overall strengths and weaknesses of the finalist papers and then 
selected the two winners. All these procedures were strictly double-blind: only the organizers 
were aware of the identity of the authors of each paper, and they never took direct part in the 
reviewing process or disclosed the authors’ identity to the reviewers and the jurors. 
 
The first two papers published in this issue are the final winners of the competition. 
Hong Yu Wong’s paper, On the necessity of bodily awareness for bodily action, clarifies the 
way in which bodily awareness has a constitutive role in the sense of embodied agency, that 
is, the control of bodily action.  Wong starts by presenting the Necessity principle, inspired 
by the work of Brian O’Shaughnessy according to which the feeling of a body part “from the 
inside” is necessary for acting with that body part. Wong critically analyzes this argument 
and presents three key challenges to the Necessity principle: neurological cases of 
deafferentation (i.e. elimination or interruption of proprioceptive feedback), brain-machine 
interface technologies, and the automatic nature of most of our everyday bodily actions.  
Even though these counterexamples can be used to draw the conclusion that bodily 
awareness plays a peripheral role in bodily agency, Wong concludes that they cannot deny 
the presence of “some intimate connection between bodily awareness and agency.”  Thus, we 
may have to accept that the link between bodily experience and agency is not one of 
necessity, and that bodily awareness may be at a “remove from a direct role” in online 
control of action. Thomas Goschke, in his commentary, further examines what the role of 
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body-awareness for control of action may be in the light of recent empirical findings from 
cognitive neurosciences.  
 
The other winner is Dave Ward’s paper, The ‘agent’ in magenta: Action, color and 
consciousness. The paper investigates the relationship between conscious experience and 
action. Focusing on color perception Ward argues that action plays a crucial role in our 
experience of color. The paper considers two types of enactive approaches (the sensorimotor 
theory and the action space theory) that claim to explain the phenomenon and notices that 
each faces one important objection. The action space account has problems with the 
objectivity of color while the sensorimotor account seems unable to do justice to the 
subjective features of color perception. Ward argues that a hybrid account can resist each of 
the criticisms and suggests that in addition it can be extended beyond color perception into a 
more general account of the relationship between action and perception. In their commentary, 
Erik Myin and Daniel Hutto discuss the extent to which a strong interpretation of an action-
space account can be considered as a kind of cognitivism in the form of conservative 
enactivism.  
 
In her paper Searching for the source of executive attention, Catherine Stinson 
outlines a philosophical critique of recent neuropsychological studies on executive attention, 
as a necessary preliminary step before addressing broader questions on how to study 
consciousness empirically. Stinson notices that, even though the connection between 
consciousness and attention is often acknowledged, and there is an abundant 
neuropsychological literature on attention, there has been little philosophical inquiry on how 
such a literature should bear on the ongoing search for the biological foundations of 
consciousness. This is problematic, because some of the assumptions made on the nature and 
function of attention may turn out to be misleading, and attempts at bypassing such 
difficulties via empirical research alone may prove ineffective. Indeed, Stinson argues that a 
common way of conceiving of attention as a causal agent runs into severe philosophical 
difficulties, and that the progressive accumulation of empirical evidence about the role of 
prefrontal cortex in attention will not be able to solve this quandary. In her  diagnosis, this is 
because «the question at stake – whether a brain region can pay attention – is not an 
empirical question, but a metaphysical one.” Stinson’s paper is here commented upon by 
Andy Clark, to the purpose of highlighting some open problems in current interdisciplinary 
work on attentional processes. 
 
Adrian Smith’s paper, Acting on (bodily) experience, focuses on the spatial content of 
bodily experience. To approach this question, Smith begins by examining the necessity and 
sufficiency of different corporeal frames of reference for characterizing the spatial content of 
bodily experience. Smith examines in detail an influential reference frame that is meant to 
provide clear-cut criteria for “sameness of bodily location” put forward by Bermúdez. In his 
analysis, Smith concludes that not any corporeal frame of reference constitutes an 
intracorporeal frame of reference. Instead, a more viable way for understanding the spatial 
content of bodily experience is to look at body-mereological representations, that is, explicit 
part-part relations, upon which part-whole relations may be dependent. This argument is 
further developed in the last section that specifically addresses the role of focal somatic 
attention that is egocentrically structured in virtue of being driven by action-oriented 
representations.  Smith suggests that it is specifically the agent’s   “practical understanding” 
of the body’s structure   that provides her with an intracorporeal frame of reference. Although 
in her commentary  Frederique de Vignemont   acknowledges the clarity and strengths of 
Smith’s analysis, she focuses on two critical problems. First, neuropsychological cases of 
“numbsense” and deafferentation suggest that there may be more than one type of bodily 
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spatial representations, and only one of them is linked to actions. Second, de Vignemont 
argues that Smithhas explained  the origin of the spatial content of our bodily experience (i.e. 
actions), but, perhaps, he has not yet explained   the spatial content per se: “the spatial 
content may be determined by action, but what does action determine?” 
 
Julian Kiverstein’s paper, The minimal sense of self, temporality and the brain, 
explores the possibility of a neuroscientific explanation of consciousness. More specifically, 
the paper is concerned with the claim that there is a neural representational system for any 
given experience, and that it is the minimal supervenience base of that experience. It argues 
that the minimal supervenience thesis is subject to two readings, which it calls the localist 
and the holist reading. Localist theories seek to identify the minimal supervenience base for 
specific experiences. They sideline questions about the nature of creature consciousness, 
treating the neural basis of creature consciousness as merely a causally necessary background 
condition for a particular conscious experience. Holists on the other hand prioritize creature 
consciousness and argue that we can only account for particular states of consciousness in the 
context of an account of creature consciousness. Kiverstein argues that any scientific 
explanation of consciousness must account for a minimal sense of self that is intrinsic to 
every conscious state. Holist theories are best able to accommodate this feature. The paper 
ends by connecting the minimal sense of self with the temporal structure of consciousness 
and by sketching two (related) information processing frameworks, which might contribute 
to a holist account of the neural basis of the minimal sense of self. Wheeler argues that while 
Kiverstein’s overall position is attractive and powerful, there are a number of problems with 
the details of the supporting argument. In particular, he questions whether the dependency 
relations between the minimal sense of self and the temporal structure of conscious 
experience are quite as Kiverstein suggests. In addition, Wheeler argues that there are cases 
of conscious experience that do not involve a minimal sense of self. If this were right, then it 
would count against Kiverstein’s claim that creature consciousness consists in the possession 
of a minimal sense of self. Finally, Wheeler argues that the localist-friendly distinction 
between the constitutive background conditions and the core realizer of a given experience is 
rather more robust than Kiverstein takes it to be.    
 
Simone Duca’s paper, Indicative conditionals and rationality, suggests a new 
interpretation of some findings on Wason’s card selection task, based on Adams’ 
probabilistic interpretation of indicative conditionals. This   raises interesting questions on 
the nature of human rationality and how  we should gauge it in conditional reasoning tasks. 
Duca emphasizes that considering humans’ poor performance at the Wason’s task as 
indicative of poor conditional reasoning is likely to be a misleading diagnosis of the 
empirical findings, based on the assumption that the relevant conditional is to be understood 
as a material implication. In contrast, there are reasons to maintain that the proper 
interpretation is in terms of indicative conditionals, and this might affect how we assess the 
rationality of the tested subjects, depending on what logic of indicative conditionals we are 
willing to apply. Duca proposes to use Adams’ probabilistic view of indicative conditionals 
to interpret standard findings with the Wason’s selection task, and shows how this enables a 
better analysis of what exactly might go wrong in people’s conditional reasoning on that task. 
Namely, Duca argues that subjects have perfectly legitimate reasons to refrain from applying 
contraposition to the Wason’s task, since this rule is not valid in Adams’ logic of indicative 
conditionals; nonetheless, people also fail to apply modus tollens, which is a valid rule in this 
case, and doing so produces the specific patterns of response characteristic of the task. 
Duca’s arguments and conclusions are then taken up and cross-examined by Joëlle Proust in 
her commentary, to further this debate on conditional reasoning and human rationality. 
Proust begins her commentary by asking whether the poor performance in the Wason’s task 
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reflects a failure in rational reasoning, or whether participants understand the task in an 
unanticipated way. To approach this questions, Proust emphasized the need to understand 
how participants recognize which method is contextually appropriate, and how a theorist can 
discover the method used by the participants, and, finally, to validate what makes a specific 
decision rational given a specific context.  
 
We would like to congratulate the six finalists for submitting the excellent papers that 
you will read in this special issue of PSYCHE. We would also like to thank all the authors 
who submitted their work for the CNCC Essay Award, the 64 reviewers, and the six jurors 
who assessed the submissions. We are grateful to the University of Edinburgh for hosting the 
final event. The CNCC Essay Award was sponsored by the EUROCORES Program  
Consciousness in a Natural and Cultural Context funded by the European Science 
Foundation (ESF), and fully supported by Dr Eva Hoogland, Program  Coordinator for 
CNCC. We are grateful to Dr Hoogland for her continuing enthusiasm and support.  
 
Finally, we would like to thank the editors of PSYCHE, Gabriel Kreiman and Robert 
Van Gulick, for accepting our proposal for this special issue well before we opened up the 
Call of Proposals, and the executive editor Stephanie Ortigue for her help and patience in 
preparing this issue. Our intention was to give the opportunity to young scholars to present 
their original work and allow them to engage in a constructive dialogue with established 
scholars from the field of consciousness studies. We believe that similar initiatives for 
disseminating the work of junior scholars should be undertaken by other organizations, 
institutions, and foundations. We hope that the quality of the papers and commentaries 
presented in this Special Issue will make a valuable contribution to the interdisciplinary study 
of consciousness. 
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